


FIG.1



O9700390 .O7060I


j





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FIG.4

**DBMS** 

Permission Test Unit

## Member List GL $\alpha$

| Group ID | Public Key<br>Serial No. | Member<br>Public Key | Team Member's     |  |  |  |
|----------|--------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|--|--|--|
| :        | :                        | :                    | Digital Signature |  |  |  |

Secret Key List CKL a

| Secret Key No. | Public Key<br>Serial No. | Encrypted Key |  |  |  |
|----------------|--------------------------|---------------|--|--|--|
| 122            | 11: AA                   | qwer          |  |  |  |
| 122            | 1C: FF                   | zxcv          |  |  |  |
| 122            | E5: 4B                   | wurt          |  |  |  |

## Group Secret Key List G CKL a

| Group ID | Secret Key No. |  |  |  |  |
|----------|----------------|--|--|--|--|
| B team   | 123            |  |  |  |  |

## Encrypted Data List EDL a


| End Jprod Data End End |                       |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|------------------------|-----------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Data ID                | <b>Encrypted Data</b> |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4444                   | inninininini          |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Data & Secret Key List DCKL $\alpha$

| Data ID | Secret Key No. |
|---------|----------------|
| 4444    | 123            |

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Example: Registration of Public key ID for Group (Method of sharing secret key within the group) FIG.6





FIG.7

Registration of Secret Key (Method of sharing Key with in Group)




8

Example of Encryption (Method of Sharing Secret Key within Group)

FIG.8


roade. opzobzed





Example of Encryption (Method of Sharing Secret Key with respectively selected user)

FIG. 9

| <b>.</b> |   |                                    |  |                | Encrypted Key    | S settle  | <b>B</b>      | olk)<br>Olwi<br>Xform |  | Data ID Secret Key No. |  | - |
|----------|---|------------------------------------|--|----------------|------------------|---|---------------|-----------------------|--|------------------------|--|---|
| Server   |   |                                    |  |                | y Public Key No. | IEAA<br>ICFF                                    | Thirty I      | 1LAA<br>ICFF          |  | Encrypted Data.        | THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF TH |   |
|          |   |                                    |  | ·              | Secret Key       | ជន  | 1             | 222                   |  | Data ID .              | ##   |   |
|          | of the encryption,<br>1 time.   | Public Key No.   Member Public Key | Publict Key<br>Cryptography S94 $\alpha$ |                | 11:AA olbi       | 1CFF Ciwi<br>E&4B Xicma                         | 1313118131111 | S95 a                 |  |                        |  |   |
| Client   | In specifying the user at the time of the<br>the encrypted key is registered each time. | 291 α                              | Secret Key Generation                    | $(893 \alpha)$ |                  | Skeyl $\alpha$ (S92 $\alpha$ )  Help Secret Key | Cryptography  |                       |  |                        |  |   |







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
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
Input Sent Transmitted Message 11  $\beta$ SC6B SC7B Creation of Transmitted Message MD12a β SC12 β Verify Message Digest of Received Contents SC5 B Alterd or Communication Error ► Alterd or Communication Error SC11 B Verify Session Information SC2 B SC3 B SC10 B Verify Recipient Information SC1 B Decompose Message الا Signature Verification using recipient's Public K 9 Obtain Message Digest of Composed Message 2 SC13 B SC4B contents Are the received contents indifferent from the sent contents? InputRecieved ContentsConirmation Data 13 B SC9 B Verify Sender Information Reciepient's Digital Síenature? YES XES S No-Alternation Verify Recieved Message Contents SC8 B


nero...orco.

**FIG13** 




TOSOZO" OKEDOZGO FIGIS





OSZOGSOG OZOGOL



(Two are compared and verified.)

MDβ

Plain Text


4a B


2β



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**FIG.19** 






#1 27


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FIG.21



DOZOOZOO DZOCE






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FIG.23






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
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FIG.24



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199491482101 199491482101

\_ FIG.26





FIG27






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**FIG.28** 



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Encrypted Information.

Encrypted Message 1 Data Tamper Detection Data 1

Encrypted Data Tamper Detection Data 2

Encrypted Key A Information

Encrypted Key B

1

Encrypted Information

Message 1.

Encrypted Data Tamper Detection Data 1

Message 1

Encrypted Key A Information

Encrypted Key B


Encrypted Key B

Encrypted Key C

'IG29

••••

FIG.30



schedule ( Team 101, 1998/10/1)

User ID and Encrypted Key

ekeyl Ay A

 $\mathbf{B}$ ekeyl By

C ekey1 Cγ **Key Information** 

SignedKeyly

Date Group, Encrypted Message and data Tamper Detectio Code

10/1.1 CryptDataly WessageDly

10/1.2 CryptData27HessageD27


Information Storing device 30 γ



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FIG.31



Schedule( Team 101, 1998/10/1)

User ID and Encrypted Key

A ekeyl  $A^{\gamma}$ 

B ekeyl  $B^{\gamma}$ 

C ekeyl Cy

**Key Information** 

SignedKeyl y

Date Group, Encrypted Message and data Tamper Detectio Code

10/1. 1 CryptData1 γ MessageD1 γ

10/1. 2 CryptData2 γ MessageD2 γ

10/2. 1 CryptData3 γ MessageD3 γ

10/2. 2 CryptData4 γ MessageD4 γ

30 y




FIG.32

Team101: Schedule

Oct.

| B: Go to Seminar<br>15:00~ | 2: A:Meeting 17:00~ |  |
|----------------------------|---------------------|--|
| ·                          | ·                   |  |

**FIG.33** 



: ...**a** 

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FIG.34






FIG.35






FIG.36







**FIG37** 

FIG38B

FIG38A










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FIG.39








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FIG.42



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**FIG.43** 

# List Authorization request






FIG.44



# DOYDOWSO. OYDOS



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Team data lists Storing device 31  $\delta$  (Server SV  $\delta$  ) Since it turns out that A had deleted B with the proper permission, the 101 & list is deleted B with the proper permission, Since it turns out that A had  $TM \delta = Z$ Sub  $AU \delta = W,V$ Digital Signature  $| TM \delta = Z$ of Z Sub AU  $\delta = W_iV$  $TM\delta = A$ , Sub  $AU\delta = B$ ,C  $TM \delta = A$ , Sub  $AU \delta = C$  $TM \delta = A$ Sub  $AU \delta = C$ Root  $\delta/101$ , TM  $\delta = A$ Root  $\delta$  /101, TM  $\delta = A$ 101/103, TM 6 =A 101/103, TM 8=Z 101/103, TM  $\delta = Z$ updated and the 103 & list is deleted Signature Signature Signature Digital Signature the lists is updated Signature Digital Signature Signature Signature Signature Digital of A Digital of Z Digital of A Digital of A Digital of B Digital of A Digital of A ofA S776: AUD 8 S79 6 : AUD 8 AUD 8 AULS AUD 8 AUL 6 AUL 8 AUL AUD 8 AUL 8 request of the sub AU Ø of the team of the 7010 of AUD & and 1018 teams of 1018 the delete 101 6 ~ 103 8 € command of the Tradsmission Transmission of AUD Sand AUL , AUL 6 103δ 101 & and 103 & updated teams Modification Transmission and 103 6 which were team 1018 AUL 6 δ of the FIG.46 S72 8 AUD 8 apdated S71 8 101δ and Team data lists administration device 30  $\delta$  (Client CL  $\delta$  ) S75 & : A recognizes an existence of the team  $103 \delta$  when the team 103 $TM \delta = Z$ Sub AU  $\delta = W,V$  $TM \delta = Z$ Sub AU  $\delta = W,V$  $TM \delta = A$ , Sub  $AU \delta = C$  $TM \delta = A,$ Sub AU  $\delta = C$ (AUD  $\delta$  of 103  $\delta$  is signed.) Root  $\delta$  /101, TM  $\delta$  =A  $\delta$  is desired to be continued. Root  $\delta/101$ , TM  $\delta = A$ which were created newly, when the 101/103, TM 8 =Z S78  $\delta$ : Transmission of the cancel command of AUD 6, AUL 6 and 103 6 101/103, $TM \delta = Z$ team 103 & was desired to be deleted. S73 6 : A deletes the creation privilege of B Signature Signature Signature Signature Signature Signature Signature who is the sub AU of  $101 \delta$ Digital of A Digital of Z Digital of Z Digital Digital of A Digital of A Digital ofA ofA AUL AUD 8 AULÔ AUD AUD 8 AULÔ AUD 8 AUL 8 Deletion of 101ub ô / signature Member A:  $103uc\delta$ 101ub ô 103dc  $\delta$ 101d 6 ~ 103uc δ. 101d 8 103dd 6 1018 1038~ 1018/ 1038 digital S74 ô

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
TORONGE OF TORON


who is TM of the team  $101 \delta$ , nominated as the sub AU  $\delta$  is creating the team 103  $\delta$  (AUD  $\delta$  of 103  $\delta$  is signed by C) when AUD  $\delta$  and AUL  $\delta$  of teams 101  $\delta$  and 103  $\delta$ are seen, the delete command is judged as the command published by A with proper permission, to delete AUD  $\delta$  and AUL  $\delta$  of Since it can be understand that C, to who A, Since it can be understand that C, who is the sub AU of the team  $101\,\delta$ , is creating the team  $103\,\delta$  (AUD  $\delta$  of  $103\,\delta$  is signed by and 103 ô were seen, the delete command is judged as the command published with proper permission, to delete  $ilde{A}UD$   $\delta$  and AULC) when AUD  $\delta$  and AUL  $\delta$  of teams 101  $\check{\delta}$ Team data lists Storing device 31  $\delta$  (Server SV  $\delta$  )  $TM \delta = X$ Sub AU  $\delta = W.V$  $TM \delta = A$ , Sub  $AU \delta = B$ ,C Root  $\delta$  /101, TM  $\delta$  =A TIM S=X Signature Signature Digital Signature Digital Signature δ of team 103 δ. Digital of X Digital ofC ofA AUD 8 AUL AUD 8 AULS 103 b 101d ∂ < S83  $\delta$ Transmission 101u ∂√ 103u ô. Transmission 1016人 of Command of Command S81 6 Team data lists administration device 30  $\delta$  (Client CL  $\delta$ ) Digital Signature of A Deletion of the sub team 103 ô of the team Digital Signature of ō 103 6 by privilege of A 103 6 by privilege of C 101 ô created before Command Command Member C Member A Delete Delete

SHEET LOF 13

FIG.48

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





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
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**FIG.53** 

# Member List

| Team 101 ε             |
|------------------------|
| Member-X               |
| Member-Y               |
| . Member-B             |
| Digital Signature of X |


FIG.54

# Team Master List


| Team 101 ε             |        |
|------------------------|--------|
| Member-X               | Master |
| Member-Y               | Sub    |
| Member-Z               | Sub    |
| Digital Signature of X |        |

## Member List


| Team 101 ε             |  |
|------------------------|--|
| Member-X               |  |
| Member-Y<br>:          |  |
| Member-B               |  |
| Digital Signature of X |  |



**FIG.55** 




**FIG.56** 




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
DOCKET #\_\_\_\_\_SHEET 530F

FIG.57










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FIG.60

**3a** ε






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SHEET 5 70


19919148784


**FIG.61** 




4 E : Message Broadcast Device

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



FIG.66

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
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
OBLON ET AL (703) 413-3000
DOCKET # SHEET GOF 13




Digital Signing Unit


Signature by the message digest and private key (signing key)





**FIG.69** 






TOSTOCED TOST



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
DOCKET # SHEET LOF 13


FIG. 71



Since the member list was created by the team master or the sub master with the proper permission, the process is continued. OBLON ET AL (703) 413-3000


DOCKET # SHEET 68 OF 13.





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It is judged that the team master was changed under the normal manipulation by the team master with the proper permission.





OBLON ET AL (703) 413-3000

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**FIG.75** 

### The list stored at the server side





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